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Maritime Piracy:  
A Sustainable Global Solution 
Paul R. Williams* & Lowry Pressly†‡ 
Maritime piracy is a complex transnational security 
concern characterized by emerging international finance 
operations and organization, an oversupply of labor, and a low 
cost of market entry. This article provides a realistic picture of 
the driving forces behind maritime piracy in areas such as 
Southeast Asia, the Gulf of Aden, and the Gulf of Guinea. By 
examining some of the assumptions and proposed solutions in 
counter-piracy literature and policy, this article exposes 
some piracy illusions and proposes a sustainable, global response 
that addresses the persistent threat of modern maritime piracy. 
Today’s manifold piracy challenges call for a multifaceted 
approach. Accordingly, this article sets forth a sustainable 
remedy that incorporates onboard security, an international 
tribunal to coordinate and secure the prosecutions of pirate 
organizers and financiers, and a set of policies that allows 
private industry to innovate while internalizing a greater portion 
of the political, legal, and economic costs of the shipping 
industry. 
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I.  Introduction 
Articles on maritime piracy often begin by setting a rich scene, 
calling to mind the swarthy buccaneers of piracy’s golden age, 
describing the new breed of AK-47-toting Somali pirates, or by laying 
out some truly sensational statistics. Freighted as the subject is by 
tales of romance and adventure, yardarm hangings, and faith slavery, 
articles on piracy naturally lend themselves to dramatic hooks and 
entertaining anecdotes. Clever titles abound.1 The problem of global 
piracy, however, is both more serious and less exciting than these 
anecdotes suggest, and if we are to take a clear-eyed assessment of the 
issue, then it behooves us to get an accurate, global context before we 
begin to address the problem. 
Despite the recent media attention to maritime piracy, including 
a forthcoming blockbuster about the MV Maersk Alabama hijacking 
starring Tom Hanks, the hype surrounding contemporary maritime 
piracy has been somewhat overblown. Indeed, incidents of maritime 
piracy have declined sharply in recent years. In 2012, 297 ships were 
attacked: 174 of those ships were boarded, and only 28 were 
successfully taken.2 Those numbers are down from 439 attacks with 45 
 
1. See, e.g., Peter T. Leeson, An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economic of 
Pirate Organization, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1049, 1049 (2007). 
2. ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS: 
REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY - 31 DECEMBER 2012, at 11 (2013).  
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ships taken in 2011,3 and 445 attacks and 53 hijackings at global 
piracy’s peak in 2010.4 Given the many thousands of ships that transit 
the 140 million square miles of open ocean every year, the odds of any 
one being attacked are obviously very low. Indeed, even in the highly 
pirated waters off the coast of Somalia, where 40 percent of all pirate 
attacks occur, the odds of a ship getting hijacked are estimated to be 
only between 1 in 750 and 1 in 1,100.5 Nevertheless, the annual cost of 
piracy to the global economy is estimated to be upwards of $18 
billion.6   
And yet, despite the recent downturn in pirate attacks, it is 
becoming increasingly clear that current efforts are not likely to be 
successful at putting an end to the global maritime piracy problem 
any time soon.7 Ninety percent of international trade moves by sea, 
including 60 percent of the world’s crude oil,8 a figure that is only 
likely to increase in the coming years.9 Moreover, just as the bulk of 
pirate activity shifted from Southeast Asia to the Gulf of Aden to the 
Gulf of Guinea, piracy continues to spread across the globe. Pirate 
attacks are on the rise in the oil rich, security poor coast of West 
Africa, where understaffed law enforcement balks at confronting 
pirates with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).10 In fact, the number 
 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. THE WORLD BANK, THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, 
REBUILDING A NATION 25 (2013). 
6. Id. at 5. 
7. See Somali Piracy: Just Taking a Break, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 23, 
2012), http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2012/10/somali-piracy 
(explaining that a number of vessels and crew members are still being 
held by pirates in Somalia, and piracy organization is still in place). 
8. ELIZABETH ANDERSON ET AL., ONE EARTH FUTURE, SUPPRESSING 
MARITIME PIRACY: EXPLORING THE OPTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 
(2009).  
9. See INT’L MAR. ORG. & MAR. KNOWLEDGE CTR., INTERNATIONAL 
SHIPPING FACTS AND FIGURES – INFORMATION RESOURCES ON TRADE, 
SAFETY, SECURITY, ENVIRONMENT § 2.1 (2012), available at 
http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ShipsAndShippingFactsAndFigu
res/TheRoleandImportanceofInternationalShipping/Documents/Internat
ional%20Shipping%20-%20Facts%20and%20Figures.pdf (explaining how 
shipping has been integral to global economic growth, and “if the trade 
growth trend of the last 150 years continues . . . by 2060 the 8 billion 
tonnes of cargo will have grown to 23 billion tonnes). 
10. Joe Bavier, Insight: Nigerian Pirate Gangs Extend Reach off West 
Africa, REUTERS (May 29, 2013), http://in.news.yahoo.com/insight-
nigerian-pirate-gangs-extend-reach-off-west-071154846.html (“Pirates’ 
use of rocket-propelled grenades to halt ships leave Ivory Coast’s police 
feeling helplessly outgunned.”).  
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of ships attacked off the coast of West Africa recently surpassed the 
number of attacks off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden.11 
However, West Africa is not the only area that is seeing an increase in 
pirate activity. Piracy is on the rise everywhere from Indonesia to 
Peru, Singapore, and Bangladesh.12   
A few elements of maritime piracy have made the profession 
attractive across the centuries and continents: entry into the market 
is easy, start-up costs are low, and the potential returns are high. 
Today, pirate revenues are at an all-time high, whether in the form of 
ransoms in the Gulf of Aden or black market oil sales in the Gulf of 
Guinea.  Start-up costs are also at an all-time low; all one really needs 
to become a pirate is a skiff, some sailors, and probably some basic 
gear, all of which is mass produced and readily available (an AK-47 
rifle sells between $100 and $200 in Somalia,13 and cutlasses, grappling 
hooks, ladders, etc. are substantially cheaper). Moreover, mechanisms 
of community finance, like the “pirate stock exchange” in Haradhere, 
Somalia, put mounting a small-time pirate expedition within the 
hands of any enterprising fisherman.14  Given the well-publicized 
successes of Southeast Asian and Somali pirates, it should not be 
surprising that poor criminals from Bangladesh to Nigeria are getting 
into the business.15  
The modus operandi of maritime pirates—be they Nigerian, 
Somali, or Indonesian—has persisted more-or-less unchanged from the 
 
11. Alan Cowell, West African Piracy Exceeds Somali Attacks, Report Says, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/ 
world/africa/west-african-piracy-exceeds-somali-attacks-report-
says.html?_r=1&. 
12. See Live Piracy & Armed Robbery Report 2013, ICC COMMERCIAL 
CRIME SERVS., http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-
piracy-report (last visited June 23, 2013); see also IMB Reports Drop in 
Somali Piracy, but Warns Against Complacency, ICC COMMERCIAL 
CRIME SERVS. (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/811-imb-
reports-drop-in-somali-piracy-but-warns-against-complacency (reporting 
the spread of piratical attacks in the Gulf of Guinea and South East 
Asia). 
13. GRADUATE INST. OF INT’L STUDIES, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2007, at 279 
(2007). 
14. James Kraska, Freakonomics of Maritime Piracy, 16 BROWN J. WORLD 
AFF. 109, 115 (2010). 
15. Indeed, in just five years the average pirate ransom jumped from just 
$150,000 to over $5 million. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, ORGANISED 
MARITIME PIRACY AND RELATED KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM 10 (2011), 
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ 
organised%20maritime%20piracy%20and%20related%20kidnapping%20f
or%20ransom.pdf 
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days of Barbarossa and Ned Low.16 What does present a new and 
particularly difficult challenge for the counter-piracy community, 
however, is the transnational business model of some of today’s pirate 
organizations. Maritime piracy has evolved from an essentially 
localized phenomenon of ad hoc banditry conducted by local criminals 
to one funded by the global networks of transnational organized 
crime.17 Never before has it been so easy to transfer start-up funds 
and profits across seas and national boundaries.  Unlike the pieces of 
eight of yesteryear, today’s pirate gains come in the form of cash or 
black market goods, which are quickly converted to cash, and these 
funds quickly disappear into the world’s formal and informal banking 
networks.18 Further complicating the issue, the sources of 
transnational pirate finance and organization have become deeply 
intertwined with legitimate and criminal forms of private enterprise.19 
These organizations are capable of funding sophisticated piracy 
operations from hundreds or thousands of miles away.20 Accordingly, 
the most successful of the localized counter-piracy efforts have merely 
pushed the pirates and their financiers into other waters.21  
 
16. PHILIP GOSSE, THE HISTORY OF PIRACY 1 (Dover Publ’ns 2007) (1932) 
(explaining that throughout history, piracy follows a well-defined cycle); 
see also J. L. Anderson, Piracy and World History: An Economic 
Perspective on Maritime Predation, 6 J. WORLD HISTORY 175, 184 
(1995) (describing the “piracy cycle” outlined by Philip Gosse). 
17. See, e.g., Jatin Dua & Ken Menkhaus, The Context of Contemporary 
Piracy, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 749, 761 (2012); Mark T. Nance & Anja 
P. Jakobi, Laundering Pirates? The Potential Role of Anti-Money 
Laundering in Countering Maritime Piracy, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 857, 
860, 874 (2012); Caroline Copley, Somali Piracy Becoming a “Criminal 
Enterprise,” REUTERS (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2011/02/16/somalia-piracy-enterprise-idAFLDE71F27E20110216. 
18. Nance & Jakobi, supra note 17, at 868. 
19. See Dua & Menkhaus, supra note 17, at 761 (stating that financing 
flows through illicit means of human smuggling as well as through the 
legal trade of dhow and livestock); Nance & Jakobi, supra note 17, at 
860, 874 (noting that pirate financing can manifest in many different 
patterns, and knowing whether the source is extra-regional can inform 
an effective counter-piracy strategy). 
20. See Dua & Menkhaus, supra note 17, at 761 (describing how piracy 
financing comes from both local clan sources as well as multinational 
banks); Nance & Jakobi, supra note 17, at 860, 874 (emphasizing the 
transnational nature of piracy the extra-regional location of many pirate 
financiers). 
21. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME [UNODC], TRANSNATIONAL 
ORGANIZED CRIME IN WEST AFRICA: A THREAT ASSESSMENT 51 (2013) 
(explaining, for example, that once Benin was reclassified as “risky,” due 
to piracy attacks, the cost of business there increased to the point that 
business halted, and piracy was displaced to Togo). 
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Although maritime piracy is, as U.S. Admiral Michael Mullen 
recognized, a “transnational security challenge,” the solutions offered 
tend to be localized in scope.22 To be sure, localized solutions to 
piracy have been effective in tamping down or eliminating maritime 
piracy in areas such as the Strait of Malacca and the Caribbean, 
though the emergence of pirates in other shipping lanes supports the 
rather self-evident conclusion that localized solutions have not 
addressed the problem of piracy worldwide.23 The millions of miles of 
underdeveloped coastline and open ocean will continue to permit the 
launching of pirate attacks, and so long as there are poor men along 
these shorelines, there will be a ready supply of pirate labor. Thus the 
implication of the new transnational paradigm—characterized by 
transnational networks of finance and organization, the oversupply of 
pirate labor, and the ease of market entry—is that successful localized 
strategies will ultimately fall short of addressing what is essentially a 
global problem.24   
A global problem calls for a global solution. Such a solution, 
moreover, must be sustainable in the long-term, since pirates are 
always poised to return to their trade if enforcement efforts fade. The 
solutions offered in the current piracy literature, however, either fail 
to account for the global nature of modern maritime piracy, are 
politically and economically unsustainable, or both. This article will 
proceed by clarifying some operative misconceptions and illusions in 
the current counter-piracy literature in order to offer a sustainable, 
global solution to maritime piracy that focuses both on deterrence at 
the point of attack and disruption of transnational networks of 
organization and finance. This top-down, bottom-up approach has 
three fundamental components: (1) using private security on ships to 
raise the cost of starting a successful pirate expedition to a level 
beyond the reach of the littoral world’s fishermen and small time 
gangsters; (2) establishing an international piracy court to cut off the 
sources of funding that are required to mount a successful pirate 
expedition given the raised start-up costs; and (3) allowing private 
 
22. MICHAEL G. MULLEN, THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2011), available at http://www.jcs.mil/ 
content/files/2011-02/020811084800_2011_NMS_-_08_FEB_2011.pdf. 
23. See Richard Valdmanis & Jonathan Saul, W. Africa Pirates Adapt 
After Nigeria Crackdown, REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2011), 
www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/21/ozatp-piracy-westafrica-idAFJOE7 
8K0FM20110921 (quoting a U.S. official, “[t]hese guys [the pirates] are 
like roaches—once you try and stomp on them they are going to go 
somewhere else”).  
24. INTERPOL Secretary-General Ron Noble said, “INTERPOL has long 
asserted that maritime piracy is a classic transnational crime problem 
which may occur on the high seas but is part of a wider global 
network . . . .” Nance & Jakobi, supra note 17, at 874. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2013 
Maritime Piracy: A Sustainable Global Solution 
183 
industry the space to innovate and experiment with effective 
deterrence techniques while holding industry responsible for its share 
of the political, legal, and economic costs of those efforts.  
II.  Righting the Ship: Clarifying Misconceptions of 
Piracy’s Causes and Cures 
A. Piracy: An Expansive View 
Before addressing the proposed solutions to the problem of 
maritime piracy, it is important to understand exactly what that 
problem is. The international law definition of maritime piracy, as 
codified in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), is 
an “illegal act[] of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends” beyond a state’s twelve-mile territorial 
waters.25 Most incidents of depredation for private ends at sea, 
however, take place within a state’s territorial waters and therefore do 
not qualify as piracy in this technical sense.26 Although the UNCLOS 
definition may reflect centuries of customary international law and a 
respect for national territorial sovereignty, it is not particularly useful 
for developing a counter-piracy strategy. Thus, it should not be 
surprising that the international counter-piracy community tends to 
talk about something more expansive when it considers the piracy 
problem.27 
Taking a survey of the piracy literature, both academic and 
journalistic, it seems that the problem as commonly identified is not 
merely armed robbery outside of a state’s territorial waters, nor is it 
attempted piracy; the problem is the actual hijacking of ships, 
irrespective of distance from shore.28 This makes sense, since some 
 
25. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, opened for signature 
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
26. See JAMES KRASKA, CONTEMPORARY MARITIME PIRACY: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, STRATEGY, AND DIPLOMACY AT SEA 38 (2011); 
Peter Chalk, Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Scope, Dimensions, Causes 
and Responses, 16 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 89, 90 (2010), available at 
http://relooney.fatcow.com/SI_FAO-Africa/Piracy_14.pdf. 
27. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 87 (noting various 
“piracy typologies” to describe different types of piracy). 
28. Indeed, even the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed this 
conception in United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(reiterating that “the international viewpoint that piracy committed on 
the high seas is an act against all nations and all humankind and that 
persons committing those acts on the high seas, as well as those 
supporting those acts from anywhere, may be prosecuted by any nation 
under international law”). See also S.C. Res. 2015, paras. 5, 16, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/2015 (Oct. 24, 2011) (considering robberies at sea occurring 
both within the twelve nautical mile territorial zone (armed robbery at 
sea) and those occurring without (piracy) to be the appropriate subject 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2013 
Maritime Piracy: A Sustainable Global Solution 
184 
mild harassment from nearby skiffs or even some light arms or RPG 
fire from a distant skiff that does not result in a hijacking would 
hardly have consequences on global commerce or pose a significant 
threat to life and limb, whereas a hijacking is a major blow to trade 
and human safety regardless of its location. When academics and 
policymakers talk about counter-piracy success, we do not envision a 
world in which no ships are harassed—a vision too utopian to be 
taken seriously—but rather one in which merchant ships worldwide 
can leave their ports of origin, transit international waters, and 
offload their cargoes at their destinations without being hijacked.29 
Strangely, however, the problem of piracy is often treated as a 
symptom of a larger problem rather than the disease itself.30 Certain 
socioeconomic and geopolitical conditions—weak law enforcement, 
high unemployment and poverty, access to sea lanes and weapons—
undoubtedly enable the existence of piracy, but when a commentator 
makes an assertion such as, “piracy cannot be eliminated without 
addressing its root causes,”31 it begs the question: What of piracy is 
left if no ships can be hijacked? That is to say, even if piracy is a 
symptom of the factors that enable crime to flourish, can there be a 
 
matter of an international “anti-piracy court”); Chalk, supra note 26, at 
90; Nacha (Poi) Udomsrirungruang & Andrijana Valladares, 
Combating Piracy in the Long-Term Through Development Efforts, in 
TASK FORCE 2012: THE CHALLENGE OF PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA 
18, 18 (2012) (positing that successful counter-piracy efforts requires 
addressing the root causes of piracy); KRASKA, supra note 26, at 38; see 
generally MARTIN N. MURPHY, SMALL BOATS, WEAK STATES, DIRTY 
MONEY 7–21 (2009) (describing the various conceptions of piracy and its 
interplay with politics and international law). 
29. This vision obviously skims over personal yachts and other types of non-
economic maritime activity, an elision that is typical in the literature. 
This article will track that practice for a few reasons, though its 
conclusions will apply to merchant shippers and pleasure cruisers alike. 
Yachts and pleasure craft make up a very small portion of the ships 
transiting areas in which pirates operate; a few high profile hijackings 
notwithstanding, the connection between contemporary maritime piracy 
and yachters is negligible. Yacht owners, moreover, do not provide a 
vital economic service to the world, unlike maritime shipping, nor are 
they compelled to transit dangerous pirate waters like some merchant 
shippers and food aid transports are. Accordingly, pleasure cruisers 
should be strongly encouraged to not sail around areas of high pirate 
danger and advised to take precautionary measures similar to those 
recommended for merchant shippers. 
30. See, e.g., Ending Somali Piracy: Go After the System, Not Just the 
Pirates, THE WORLD BANK (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.worldbank. 
org/en/news/feature/2013/04/11/ending-somali-piracy-go-after-the-
system-not-just-the-pirates (shifting the focus of counter-piracy 
measures to root causes and the underlying political system in Somalia). 
31. Udomsrirungruang & Valladares, supra note 28, at 18. 
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workable solution to the problem that does not address those 
underlying “root causes”?  
A sustainable solution to global maritime piracy requires 
refocusing the debate on the actual phenomenon of piracy, not the 
socioeconomic and geopolitical conditions that allow it to flourish.32 
This approach requires one to look carefully at the actual pirates who 
board and take ships, their financiers and organizers, and the 
maritime vessels and state navies that are involved in counter-piracy 
efforts.  
B.  The Development Illusion 
Perhaps the most common solution to the issue of maritime 
piracy can be summed up in the words of NATO Commander General 
John Craddock: “You don’t stop piracy on the seas.  You stop piracy 
on the land.”33 To be sure, this truism finds support in history, but 
solving the problem of piracy without leaving the shore is unrealistic. 
From the anti-pirate crusades of Pompey the Great in the first 
century BCE34 to the elimination of piracy in the Caribbean and 
North Africa some two millennia later, pirates were typically 
effectively suppressed only when pursued into their land-based 
hideaways and, to put it somewhat euphemistically, were “forcefully 
destroyed along with their strongholds and sanctuaries.”35 In the 
millennia before the development of international humanitarian law, a 
successful implementation of this strategy typically ended with pirate 
equipment in ashes and the pirates themselves tortured and killed.36   
In the twenty-first century, it is no longer acceptable to crucify 
pirates or to summarily hang them from the yardarm. This is not to 
say that the land incursion model has fallen completely out of favor, 
however, since in 2010 the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 
1851, enabling naval forces in the Gulf of Aden to pursue pirates onto 
Somali soil in a kind of “reverse hot-pursuit.”37 A handful of EU 
 
32. The conditions which permit flourishing piracy are simply the necessary 
conditions for crime of any sort plus access to shipping lanes. 
33. Kraska, supra note 26, at 54.  
34. Anderson, supra note 16, at 184; see generally DAVID ABULAFIA, THE 
GREAT SEA: A HUMAN HISTORY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN 196–97 
(2011). 
35. Donald J. Puchala, Of Pirates and Terrorists: What Experience and 
History Teach, 26 CONTEMP. SECURITY POL’Y 1, 13 (2005).  
36. For example, see Caesar’s infamous, and perhaps apocryphal, crucifixion 
of the pirates who had previously kidnapped him. See Plutarch, 
PLUTARCH’S LIVES VOL. VII: DEMOSTHENES AND CICERO, ALEXANDER 
AND CAESAR 447 (E. H. Warmington ed., Bernadotte Perrin trans., 
Harvard Univ. Press 1919). 
37. S.C. Res. 1851, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008); S.C. 
Res. 1950, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1950 (Nov. 23, 2010); Craig 
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Naval Force helicopter attacks notwithstanding, the on-land strategy 
of search and destroy has largely been abandoned for one of 
development.38 The development solution to maritime piracy has two 
deeply related, though occasionally separately proponed strands: 
(1) development of rule of law and domestic law enforcement 
capability such that pirates will no longer be able to operate in a 
state or region with impunity;39 and (2) economic development such 
that alternative livelihoods are available and appealing to would-be 
pirate foot soldiers.40  
The development solution has a number of faults. First, unless 
one proposes to develop all available shorelines near shipping lanes to 
the point that they will either be effectively policed or sustain 
appealing alternative livelihoods, it is essentially a localized—i.e., 
non-global—solution. In the era of transnational pirate finance and 
near-ubiquitous availability of weapons and equipment, a localized 
solution will necessarily meet with only limited success in combating 
piracy worldwide.  
The development solution also begs the question of how exactly to 
go about achieving its ends, even on a less-than-global scale.  In 
taking the focus of most of the contemporary literature—Somalia, for 
example—it seems misguided to talk of developing the Somali 
domestic economy and rule of law to a point where pirates will 
abandon piracy.41 The prospect of a functioning state in Somalia, or 
coastguards up to the task of combating and apprehending pirates in 
the Gulf of Guinea, is not a likely one in the foreseeable future.42 Scale 
this problem up to the rest of the underdeveloped littoral world that 
is or can be beset by piracy, and one is left with a solution that is 
cost-prohibitive and practically infeasible.43 Development is a possible 
 
Thedwall, Note, Choosing the Right Yardarm: Establishing an 
International Court for Piracy, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 501, 510 (2010). 
38. See, e.g., Yara Bayoumy, EU Helicopters Strike Somali Pirate Base on 
Land, REUTERS (May 15, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/ 
05/15/us-somalia-piracy-idUSBRE84E0YN20120515 
39. See Christopher Totten & Matthew Bernal, Somali Piracy: 
Jurisdictional Issues, Enforcement Problems and Potential Solutions, 41 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 377, 414 (2009). 
40. See Kraska, supra note 14, at 118.  
41. In its report, the World Bank offers a typical question-begging 
conclusion: “This report calls for a negotiated political contract between 
local stakeholders and the [Somali] central government.” THE WORLD 
BANK, supra note 5, at 175 (emphasis added). 
42. See, e.g., Ludger Schadomsky, No Stability in Sight for Somalia, 
DEUTSCHE WELLE (June 20, 2013), http://www.dw.de/no-stability-in-
sight-for-somalia/a-16896385. 
43. It seems somewhat odd that organizations like the World Bank would, 
in their solutions to maritime piracy, take on instead the much larger 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2013 
Maritime Piracy: A Sustainable Global Solution 
187 
solution to the problems of crime and poverty in Somalia, perhaps, 
but it is not a solution to the global threat of piracy.  Piracy crises 
are unlikely to be solved solely by the availability of alternative, legal 
livelihoods.44  
Cost and practical impossibility aside, the development solution is 
also essentially unsustainable for political reasons. The case of Somalia 
is again illustrative. When Somalia had a functioning state and law 
enforcement apparatus under dictator Siad Barre (including the 
largest army in Africa),45 piracy off its coastline was rare.46 However, 
when the government collapsed in the civil war of 1991, state 
authority disappeared and fertile piracy conditions emerged.47 
Although Somalia is a somewhat extreme example, the same political 
unsustainability hazards occur across the globe, whether in the form 
of civil conflict, regime change, or government incompetence and 
corruption. Simply put, a development solution is only as strong as 
the government of each individual littoral state; as a global approach, 
counter-piracy development is only as strong as its politically weakest 
link. Moreover, a development solution that relies on national 
rule-of-law development also presumes that states will actually want 
to stop the influx of foreign capital from ransoms and black market 
sales. In light of the significant flow of foreign hard currency into 
pirate-supportive states, as well as the often corrupt public 
administrations in the affected regions, the assumption that littoral 
states will cooperate in the fight against maritime piracy and its 
accompanying finance networks seems highly questionable.48 
The shortcomings of the development solution also point to a 
huge oversight in the counter-piracy literature. When discussing 
necessary conditions of piracy, the one actual necessary condition is 
almost never mentioned: a ship that can be taken. Of course 
socioeconomic and political structural conditions play an instrumental 
role in the proliferation of piracy, but boats launched from any shores 
can hijack a ship, and ransoms are so high that criminals will not 
 
and more difficult goal of legal and economic development. This might 
be explained by the fact that development is the World Bank’s business, 
its area of expertise, and the source of much of its vocabulary. 
44. Indeed, it is clear that pirates are getting into and staying in the piracy 
industry for non-subsistence reasons. The proliferation of luxury goods 
and status symbols in Somali pirate towns attests to this fact. See, e.g., 
Nance & Jakobi, supra note 17, at 869.  
45. OLIVER RAMSBOTHAM & TOM WOODHOUSE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 222 (1999).  
46. See Gary E. Weir, Fish, Family, and Profit: Piracy and the Horn of 
Africa, 62 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 15, 17 (2009). 
47. Id.; see also MURPHY, supra note 28, at 101.  
48. See Nance & Jakobi, supra note 17, at 860–61.  
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likely be dissuaded from piracy by the availability of alternative 
legitimate livelihoods (armed robberies and kidnappings on land are 
still common in the developed world, after all). Thus, the solution to 
piracy per se—not to the conditions that drive young men to crime—
must have something to say about preventing hijackings at the point 
of attack.  
C.  The State Navies Illusion  
While historically state navies have had successes in combating 
piracy, a solution that relies on state navies to combat contemporary 
maritime piracy will be both ineffective and unsustainable. The 
international community has deployed a substantial naval force to the 
Gulf of Aden in response to the spike in pirate attacks off the coast of 
Somalia.49 At any given time, a loose coalition of 20 to 32 naval 
vessels patrols the 2.9 million square nautical mile Gulf of Aden and 
its adjacent waters (an area over 1.5 times the size of Europe).50 Some 
commentators have credited this force with the downturn in 
successful pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia,51 though even the 
most ardent supporters of naval patrols rarely propose it as anything 
more than a short-term fix.52  
In fact, naval forces seem merely to have been present at the 
decline in successful pirate hijackings. Despite the unprecedented 
international counter-piracy naval mobilization in 2008, pirate attacks 
and hijackings off the coast of Somalia continued to increase annually, 
peaking in 2010-2011, only to decline a year later when private 
security onboard ships rose from 10 percent to 50 percent.53 The 
following year, as private security usage became more common 
(adoption is estimated to be as high as 70 percent54), pirate attacks 
 
49. See KRASKA, supra note 26, at 95. 
50. The WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 158; Yvonne M. Dutton, 
Gunslingers on the High Seas: A Call for Regulation, 24 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 107, 118 (2013); Bibi van Ginkel & Lennart Landman, In 
Search of a Sustainable and Coherent Strategy, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
727, 736 (2012). 
51. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 8; Totten & Bernal, supra 
note at 39, 414–15 (finding that the international naval forces have been 
particularly helpful because Somalia lacks its own navy). 
52. For an example of this thinking, see KRASKA, supra note 26, at 79 (“The 
naval forces from distance states should serve as a temporary gap-filler 
until the capacity of regional nations can be developed.”). 
53. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 86; Dutton, supra note 50, at 108. 
54. Ben West, The Expensive, Diminishing Threat of Somali Piracy, 
STRATFOR (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/ 
expensive-diminishing-threat-somali-piracy. 
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and hijackings plummeted to a five-year low.55  The lack of correlation 
between the deployment of state naval patrols and the decline of 
successful pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden is striking, particularly 
in contrast to the very strong correlation between the use of private 
security personnel and that same diminution. 
Despite the estimated $1.27 to $1.5 billion that some thirty states 
are spending on counter-piracy naval patrols every year, navies have 
at best a highly limited effect.56 Naval patrols and convoys have 
proven useful and effective when guarding high priority shipments, 
like humanitarian aid, and when escorting transit groups, but they are 
only effective at preventing successful pirate attacks if they are in the 
immediate vicinity of the merchant ship at the time of the attack.57   
Naval warships are not well suited to counter-piracy operations. 
Since it can take anywhere from hours to days for a naval vessel to 
reach the coordinates of a reported pirate attack (by which time the 
attack is typically over), naval forces are actually quite limited in 
their ability to combat piracy at the point of attack.58  Although the 
U.S. Navy SEALs have shown spectacular prowess in small-scale, 
special ops counter-piracy and hostage rescue operations,59 using 
massive warships to deter pirate skiffs is, in the words of one Italian 
naval officer, like “going after someone on a bicycle with a truck.”60  
Despite the massive international effort and public expense, 
military experts find the current counter-piracy force patrolling the 
Gulf of Aden to be hugely insufficient for the task of combating 
 
55. Piracy Falls in 2012, but Seas off East and West Africa Remain 
Dangerous, Says IMB, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVS. (Jan. 16, 2013), 
http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/836-piracy-falls-in-2012-but-seas-off-east-
and-west-africa-remain-dangerous-says-imb. 
56. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 158 (citing a 2011 Oceans Beyond 
Piracy Report); JAMES BROWN, LOWY INST. FOR INT’L POL’Y, PIRATES 
AND PRIVATEERS: MANAGING THE INDIAN OCEAN’S PRIVATE SECURITY 
BOOM 5 (2012), available at http://lowyinstitute.org/publications/ 
pirates-and-privateers-managing-indian-oceans-private-security-boom. 
57. Dutton, supra note 50, at 118. 
58. Ginkel & Landman, supra note 50, at 736 (explaining that given the size 
of the waters that are patrolled, it can sometimes take days for a 
counter-piracy naval vessel to reach the attack); see also BROWN, supra 
note 56, at 4 (reiterating that Somali piracy is too widespread for naval 
forces alone to combat). 
59. See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman et al., U.S. Swoops in to Free 2 from 
Pirates in Somali Raid, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/world/africa/us-raid-frees-2-
hostages-from-somali-pirates.html?pagewanted=all. 
60. Jeffrey Gettleman, Pirates Outmaneuver Warships off Somalia, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/16/world/ 
africa/16pirate.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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piracy, even in that relatively small region. EU Gulf of Aden Naval 
Force Atalanta commander Major General Buster Howes thinks that 
“83 [warships] would be needed in order to provide response 
conditions of half an hour,”61 while William Wechsler, former U.S. 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and 
Global Threats, suggests that “all the navies in the world could not 
possibly protect such a space.”62 A piracy solution that relies on naval 
patrols even in this relatively small corner of the sea would be akin to 
snuffing out armed robbery in New York City with a handful of beat 
cops or “patrolling an area the size of France” with a single police 
car.63 Indeed, Somali pirates responded to the Gulf of Aden naval 
patrols by shifting their operations to the unpatrolled waters of the 
Red Sea,64 and attacks are likewise on the rise in regions where the 
patrols do not operate.65 
Though naval patrols do have a deterrent effect on attacks in 
their immediate vicinity, they will only continue to have this limited 
effect as long as they remain deployed in counter-piracy operations. It 
seems unlikely that in an era of economic austerity and military cuts 
the world’s navies can be trusted to commit to such a strategy in the 
long-term. On the other hand, putting the firepower directly onboard 
ships has proven to be a highly efficient and cost-effective piracy 
deterrent. Indeed, ships that hire private security personnel—or that 
rent state military personnel—at a tiny fraction of the cost of naval 
operations have yet to be hijacked even once.66 The increasing 
adoption of private security contractors, however, has given rise to 
another illusion and unwarranted fear in the counter-piracy literature 
regarding the undesirability of replacing navies with private-sector 
hired guns: the fear of a “Blackwater moment.”67  
61. By which time it would almost always be too late. See Dutton, supra 
note 50, at 118. 
62. Id.  
63. Charlotte Eagar, To Catch a Pirate: The British Ex-Servicemen 
Battling to Protect International Shipping from the Clutches of Somali 
Pirates, THE DAILY MAIL (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ 
home/moslive/article-2071108/British-ex-servicemen-battling-protect-
international-shipping-Somali-pirates.html. 
64. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 91.  
65. See Cowell, supra note 11. 
66. Sonia Rothwell, Somali Piracy: Gone for Good?, STRATFOR (May 20, 
2013), http://www.stratfor.com/the-hub/somali-piracy-gone-good. 
67. This phrase refers to an incident in which Blackwater contractors 
unjustifiably shot and killed innocent civilians in Iraq in 2007. Michelle 
Wiese Bockmann & Alan Katz, Shooting to Kill Pirates Risks 
Blackwater Moment, BLOOMBERG (May 8, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-08/shooting-to-kill-pirates-
risks-blackwater-moment.html); Dutton, supra note 50, at 110. 
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D.  The Private Security Personnel Illusion, or Fear of a  
“Blackwater Moment” 
Given the unsustainable economic and political cost of patrolling 
navies and the proven effectiveness of private security personnel, 
much of the discussion of piracy solutions has turned to the use of 
private maritime security contractors. Though there was a time when 
private industry claimed to be wary of carrying private security on 
ships—citing concerns of escalating violence and cost—maritime 
shippers have rapidly changed their minds in light of on-ship 
security’s proven effectiveness.68 Today, private security carriage is a 
part of best management practices in the shipping industry.69 In light 
of this development, commentators worry about the suitability of 
private contractors for counter-piracy work, specifically about the 
misuse of force by private contractors. There is a widespread fear of a 
coming maritime contractor “Blackwater moment.” 
Alleged reluctance on the part of the maritime shipping industry 
notwithstanding, the overwhelming trend is toward outfitting ships 
with either private or state security personnel.70  Today, nearly three 
out of four ships transiting the Gulf of Aden carry private security 
personnel, a proportion that would probably be even higher if some 
merchant ships were not protected, however efficiently, by state navy 
escorts and transit groups.71 Shippers will be reluctant to increase 
their costs so long as naval vessels guard them for free, even though 
the costs of protection are more efficiently borne by the shippers.72 
Indeed, the ostensible reluctance of industry to hire private security 
personnel may be due as much to free-riding on naval expenditures 
and broad externalization of security costs as it is to concerns about 
the state monopolization of deadly force.73  
Underlying most of the arguments against the use of private 
security personnel is an assumption that private security contractors 
 
68. See Dutton, supra note 50, at 129. 
69. BMP 4: BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR PROTECTION AGAINST 
SOMALI BASED PIRACY §§ 8.14–8.15 (2011), available at http://www. 
mschoa.org/docs/public-documents/bmp4_low_res_sep_5_2011.pdf 
[hereinafter BMP4]. 
70. See West, supra note 54. The U.S. has authorized the use of private 
security personnel for over a century. Dutton, supra note 50, at 134. 
71. Dutton, supra note 50, at 117 (indicating that the international 
community still spends $1 billion to support naval patrols). 
72. The irony here is that it is probably cheaper overall—for shippers, the 
global community, and consumers—to hire private security contractors. 
See infra Section III.C. 
73. Indeed, the Dutch government has banned the use of private contractors 
on its ships because of fears that their usage would undermine its 
monopolization of deadly force. BROWN, supra note 56, at 9–10. 
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are somehow inherently more dangerous to innocent life than are 
uniformed soldiers. This assumption is not borne by evidence. In the 
first place, contractors are typically former military personnel “with 
shipping industry-accredited safety and training qualifications.”74 
Failing a credentials gap, ship owners have also cited Somali firepower 
and fears of escalating violence as reasons they have been reluctant to 
adopt armed security details.75 This objection ignores the incentive 
structure that drives piracy. Pirates are profit seeking, rational utility 
maximizers, who have extremely strong incentives to inflict as little 
damage as possible to the ship, the cargo, and, in instances of piracy 
for ransom, the crew. It also seems self-evident that if a ship owner 
faced the choice between some extra damage to an unhijacked ship 
and one that was captured, she would clearly choose the former.  
Recent experience with private security personnel, both on land 
and at sea, also seems to indicate that they are at least as unlikely to 
attack civilians as are uniformed soldiers and marines.  That is to say 
that if the concern about private security personnel relates to the 
misuse of force, there is no evidence to support the claim that 
contractors are less trustworthy than uniformed military personnel. 
Indeed, reported cases of counter-piracy collateral damage involved 
two Italian marines aboard an Italian flagged tanker;76 Russian 
soldiers aboard a Norwegian tanker who shot and killed unarmed 
fishermen while private security personnel held their fire;77 Russian 
soldiers aboard a Russian flagged tanker who either executed Somali 
pirates or left them in a boat to die; 78 as well as Indian and other 
unidentified international naval forces.79 Though there are reasons to 
suspect the use of force on the high seas is underreported, the 
available evidence indicates that private security personnel have not 
to date been responsible for non-justifiable civilian casualties in the 
 
74. Id. at 7. 
75. Chalk, supra note 26, at 97. 
76. See Annie Banerji & D. Jose, Insight: Murder Trial of Italian Marines 
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BLOOMBERG (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
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course of counter-piracy activities.80 Of course, this is not proof that 
state marines are more dangerous than private contractors, but it 
does cast into doubt the assumption that state forces are inherently 
safer. In light of the relative parity of private and public security, it 
seems that the general aversion to the use of private security 
personnel stems not from experience, but rather from general 
intuitions about state monopolization of force.  
It is unclear why one should assume that force in the hands of 
private contractors is necessarily more worrisome than state 
monopolization. If anything, private security personnel are subject to 
more serious oversight and sanctions than their military counterparts. 
As civilians, private security personnel are subject to the jurisdiction 
of criminal and civil courts in ways that state military personnel are 
not. Though jurisdictional issues can be confused by the combination 
of the contractor’s state, the ship’s flag state, the victim’s state, and, 
if applicable, the state in whose territorial waters a criminal act takes 
place, it is practically always the case that private citizens may only 
use deadly force in self-defense. Whereas military personnel acting on 
behalf of a state generally enjoy sovereign immunity and will almost 
certainly not be extradited from their home state to face criminal trial 
elsewhere, private citizens acting as onboard security personnel enjoy 
no such special status under the law.81 A private contractor can be 
sued for wrongful death or tried for murder in domestic courts, while 
a state marine or sailor would most likely be subject to a court 
martial at worst. Indeed, for a long time industry has preferred 
military personnel to private contractors for this very reason, 
believing that state marines and sailors simply “have better protection 
from prosecution, and more certain legal status.”82   
Similarly, official military personnel face significantly less liability 
for destroying the boats and equipment of fishermen suspected of 
piracy. It is common practice for a military ship that has taken 
control of suspected pirates to destroy their equipment, even if there 
is no evidence of piratical intent, and to drop the men on Somali 
soil.83 The loss of a skiff, of course, is a tremendous blow to the 
livelihood of any fisherman unlucky enough to cross wakes with a 
 
80. Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) have been responsible 
for the deaths of pirates; however, the evidence tends to indicate that 
the use of force was justified self-defense. See, e.g., Alan Cowell, In 
First, Private Guards Kill Somali Pirate, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/world/africa/25pirate.html?_r=0. 
81. The outlying case of the Italian Marines aboard the Enrica Lexie 
notwithstanding. See Banerji & Jose, supra note 76 (reporting that the 
Italian Marines are being tried in India). 
82. BROWN, supra note 56, at 9. 
83. KRASKA, supra note 26, at 116. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2013 
Maritime Piracy: A Sustainable Global Solution 
194 
military vessel, and it seems justice would demand that the fisherman 
have some avenue of restitution. If a state navy destroys a boat 
without sufficient justification, however, the individual fisherman has 
no recourse; rather he must rely on his nation state to sue the state of 
the aggressor party under UNCLOS in either the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) or the Law of the Sea Tribunal (LOS Tribunal).84 It 
is frankly unimaginable that a state would take up the cause of a 
single fisherman, let alone many, in a very costly and potentially 
diplomatically harmful international trial.  Private citizens and 
corporations, however, are subject to the law in ways that states are 
not, and presumably a private citizen or corporation would be subject 
to jurisdiction in at least one state where fishermen could seek 
redress. 
If anything, the enormous legal and public relations backlash after 
the eponymous “Blackwater moment” demonstrates how private 
corporations face greater penalties for misbehavior than do state 
military forces. Private security companies are much more sensitive to 
reputational costs than state navies, since in the highly competitive 
industry of private security, a firm that gets a reputation for bad acts 
(and more importantly, bad PR) will lose business to one who does 
not behave badly. In light of the significant difference in criminal, 
civil, and reputational liability between private security and military 
personnel, it seems that private security might in fact be preferable 
for on-ship counter-piracy duty.  
Of course there are some worrisome elements regarding the use of 
private security at sea. The use of private armed escort vessels, as 
opposed to security on-ship, raises serious concerns, as these vessels 
are more capable of being used for illegal, non-defensive counter-
piracy purposes.85 Private armed vessels are still subject to flag state 
jurisdiction, however, as well as territorial sea and victim party 
jurisdiction. Moreover, any non-self-defensive use of force at sea by a 
private vessel would qualify as piracy under UNCLOS and/or crimes 
at sea under the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA), and therefore 
subject the aggressor ship to universal or aut dedere aut judicare 
jurisdiction.86 A good argument may still be made for some sort of 
 
84. See UNCLOS, supra note 25, arts. 106, 110(3), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 437, 
438 (stipulating that where seizure of a ship is not justified, the state 
making the seizure is liable to the state whose vessel has been captured 
and/or damaged). 
85. See BROWN, supra note 56, at 8 (stating that armed escort vehicles 
“operate by establishing exclusion zones around the client ship and 
challenging suspicious boats that approach them”).  
86. See UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 101, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 436; 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence Against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation art. 3, opened for signature Mar. 10, 
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uniform regulation, and some international efforts are underway.87 
However, unless states adopt international regulation or model rules 
into law, these rules will serve as best management practices at most 
and will not have the full incentivizing force of the law. Moreover, 
unless best management practices are enacted into law and enforced 
across the littoral world, they will present a patchwork solution to an 
essentially global problem. 
Part of the problem with onboard private security personnel is 
that different states have different rules regarding the transit of 
weapons and security personnel through their territorial waters and 
into their ports. South Africa, for instance, has stated that it will not 
allow armed security contractors into its ports,88 while other states 
make ships pay for the privilege.89 In response to the variety of laws 
preventing security personnel coming into ports, the industry has 
adapted. Some states, like Spain, the Netherlands, France, and 
Russia, have begun to rent their soldiers to private vessels,90 while 
some private security companies have developed “floating armories” 
and procedures for offloading their weapons either in international 
waters or at friendly ports before entering into a merchant ship’s port 
of call.91 Although these innovations save shipping companies the time 
and money otherwise consumed by registering guns with the port city 
or stopping elsewhere en route,92 some commentators worry that 
floating armories will contribute to lawlessness and a high-seas 
patrolled by scofflaw cowboys.93 This does not seem like the most 
logical conclusion to draw from the facts, but rather one driven by the 
 
1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Mar. 1, 1992) [hereinafter 
1988 SUA Convention] (defining piracy and other offenses). The 
international piracy court proposed by this article would act as a strong 
check on aggressive behavior by private security companies. See infra 
Section III.B. 
87. See, e.g., 100 Series Rules: An International Model Set of Maritime 
Rules for the Use of Force, https://100seriesrules.com/ (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2014) (providing “an international model set of RUF as against 
which, Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) may 
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88. Dutton, supra note 50, at 124. 
89. For example, Djibouti sells annual permits to PMSCs to allow them to 
operate from its ports, while Sri Lanka rents out state-owned weapons. 
Id. at 121.  
90. See BROWN, supra note 56, at 9. 
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International Waters, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www. 
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92. See id. 
93. See id. 
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aforementioned faulty assumption that private guards are ipso facto 
more dangerous. Rather, these perceptions seem to indicate that 
private security companies are capable of adapting rapidly and 
creatively to the exigencies of the counter-piracy fight, while 
remaining committed to operating within the tangled web of 
international and domestic laws.94  
The experience of state naval patrols and private security 
contractors in counter-piracy operations demonstrates the 
effectiveness of having security personnel on ship. The use of onboard 
private security is both an integral part and the first prong of a 
sustainable solution to the global problem of maritime piracy and will 
be discussed at greater length in Section III.  
E.  The Foot Soldier Illusion 
Although nine out of ten pirates captured at sea are set free, 
many have in fact faced trial, principally in Kenya and the Seychelles, 
though also in the United States and Europe.95 Indeed, more than 
1,000 pirate foot soldiers currently await trial in twenty countries 
around the world.96 It is often claimed that this strategy of focusing 
anti-piracy efforts on pirate foot soldiers—i.e., those doing the actual 
pirating—will not be effective in suppressing maritime piracy.97 There 
is a great deal of truth to this assessment. Since meaningful 
socioeconomic development across the littoral world—e.g., Somalia, 
Bangladesh, Nigeria, Peru, Yemen—is years if not generations away, 
and ransoms are at an all-time high, the supply of financially 
desperate young men will outstrip the demand for pirate foot soldiers 
for the foreseeable future. Moreover, due to a variety of evidentiary 
 
94. See id. The floating armories, for instance, are efforts to comply with 
both international conventions and the panoply of domestic laws 
regulating the transit of arms.  
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Top Legal Adviser on Piracy Warns Security Council, U.N. Press 
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and political problems, captured pirates almost never face trial, and 
even if they were all arrested and indicted, it is unlikely that there 
would be enough cell space in enough willing countries to house them 
all.98 Although apprehending low-level pirates does have some 
counter-piracy effect insofar as the pirates must acquire new 
equipment and re-staff their crews, it is highly doubtful that the 
threat of capture and unlikely trial will significantly deter foot soldier 
pirates.99  
It is not the case, however, that counter-piracy measures directed 
at low-level pirates are per se useless. Private security contractors 
have effectively stopped piracy, as far as their ships are concerned, by 
focusing their prevention efforts exclusively on the foot soldiers, while 
ignoring the larger socioeconomic context.100 The incentives of 
potential incarceration are too abstract to deter desperate, hungry 
boys; the incentives presented by a ship carrying armed guards, on 
the other hand, are decidedly more immediate. To argue that focusing 
anti-piracy efforts on foot soldiers instead of the larger context is 
ineffective in stopping piracy is like arguing that burglar alarms do 
not solve the problem of burglary; while this may technically be true, 
deterrence measures at the point of attack are an important 
component of a larger, more comprehensive strategy. 
This is not to say that trials have no place in an effective global 
counter-piracy strategy.  There is a great deal of potential upside to 
trying and convicting the financiers and organizers of piracy. 
Although it may be true that the thousands if not millions of 
potential pirate foot soldiers will not be dissuaded by the threat of 
prosecution, it seems reasonable to assume that the financiers of 
piracy might be. Pirate financiers are a much smaller lot, are 
significantly more sophisticated, and have much more to lose than a 
subsistence fisherman or farmer, who has turned to piracy for 
survival.101 If the threat of prosecution becomes real, and if there are 
 
98. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA, 
2010–12, H.C. 1318, ¶¶ 78–87 (U.K.) (outlining the challenges with 
gathering evidence sufficient for piracy prosecutions, the jurisdictional 
constraints and problems with national piracy laws, and issues of prison 
capacity in prosecuting states). 
99. Nevertheless, it may even be the case that post-hoc judicial intervention 
can be successful, if only the penalties for conviction are ratcheted up to 
the appropriate level of incentive. Instances of piracy off the coast of 
Somalia plummeted, for example, when the Islamic Courts Union 
controlled most of southern Somalia in 2006-2007 and instituted a 
penalty of hand amputation for those convicted of piracy. Chalk, supra 
note 26, at 94. 
100. See Rothwell, supra note 66. 
101. See, e.g., Associated Press, Somali Piracy Backed by International 
Networks, NBC NEWS (Dec. 10 2008), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/ 
28158455/ns/world_news-africa/t/somali-piracy-backed-international-
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no holdout safe haven states, then at the very least pirate financiers 
will be forced to alter their behavior.102 To put it another way: pirate 
financiers are the majority stakeholders of global maritime piracy, and 
disrupting and disabling their finance and organizational networks 
will be a necessary component of a sustainable and global counter-
piracy approach.103 
F.  The Domestic Prosecutions Illusion 
The efficacy of trying low-level pirates aside, the crime of piracy is 
perhaps the oldest, and definitely least controversial, use of universal 
jurisdiction, and states have indicated that they want to see pirates 
face trial.104 After a few years of pirate prosecutions, however, a 
fatigue of low-level pirate trials has begun to set in.105 At the same 
time, the international community has stressed the need to disrupt 
the transnational networks of pirate finance.106 Since there is no 
solution to the problem of transnational finance analogous to the 
provision of guns on ships, it seems that law enforcement and courts 
must intercede.107 In light of this, the question becomes not whether 
 
network/undefined#.UciKSOuA-Mg (stating that transnational pirate 
syndicates have been traced as far as Canada and Europe, and earn 
millions from the ransom payments). 
102. This reasoning supports the call for an international piracy court. See 
infra Section III.B. 
103. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 118, 173 (emphasizing that 
eradicating piracy “will require a paradigm shift away from the 
perpetrators and toward the enablers of piracy”). 
104. See Totten & Bernal, supra note 39, at 391 (noting that piracy is a 
violation of customary international law and a threat to all nations; 
thus, universal jurisdiction applies). 
105. See, e.g., Kevin J. Kelley, How Kenya Backed out of Piracy Trials, 
DAILY NATION (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/How-
Kenya-backed-out-of-piracy-trials/-/1056/1229564/-/153vrutz/-/index. 
html (indicating that Kenya has backed out of its memorandum of 
understanding due to concerns that Kenya was becoming a second 
“Guantanamo Bay”).  
106. See, e.g., Andrew J. Shapiro, Testimony Before the House Committee 
on Transportation and Infrastructure’s Subcommittee on Coast Guard 
and Maritime Transportation (Apr. 10, 2013), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/2013/207361.htm; see also 
UNODC, supra note 21, at 50 (highlighting that “shore support” and 
money laundering are key elements to the crime of piracy). 
107. See Damien McElroy, ‘Al Capone’ Strategy to Defeat Piracy, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
worldnews/piracy/9633408/Al-Capone-strategy-to-defeat-piracy.html 
(suggesting law enforcement is required to tackle piracy “kingpins”); 
Press Release U.N. Security Council Supports Interpol and Europol 
Role in Combatting Maritime Piracy, EUROPOL (Nov. 24 2010), 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/press/un-security-council-
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to try those involved in pirate finance and organization, but where to 
try those involved. 
Some commentators argue that domestic courts or specialty 
piracy tribunals in states nearby to a pirate event are best suited for 
trying pirates and their financiers.108  Historically, captured pirates 
did typically face trial in domestic courts, either of their home 
jurisdiction or the flag state jurisdiction of the pirated ship.109 A 
problem arises, however, when the most appropriate jurisdiction is 
incapable or unwilling to conduct pirate trials or to incarcerate 
convicted offenders. Somalia is the most glaring contemporary 
example of this phenomenon, though it is hardly unique in the 
ineffectiveness of its domestic courts. Since Somalia lacks anything 
resembling a functional criminal justice system, it is incapable of 
satisfactorily trying the pirates operating in its waters and on its 
shores. In response to this problem, states in the region and around 
the world have accepted universal jurisdiction over pirate cases. And 
though there has been a broadly construed general preference for 
trials in regional states, pirates have faced trial in jurisdictions 
ranging from the Netherlands to the United States.110  
Although local ownership and prosecutions in a state that has 
some sort of non-universal jurisdiction over a pirate or pirate financier 
is probably ideal, the fact is that for the foreseeable future, there are 
going to be states, like Somalia, where this is not possible, as well as 
nearby states that are non-cooperative.111 With a few notable 
exceptions, states are becoming less and less willing to take pirates 
from other nations who have no connection to their jurisdiction 
whatsoever.  The United States, for instance, tries pirates caught 
attacking U.S. ships or ships laden with U.S. cargo in the Gulf of 
Aden or the Red Sea, but offloads similar pirates caught attacking 
 
supports-interpol-and-europol-role-combating-maritime-piracy-653 
(recognizing that Europol’s and INTERPOL’s law enforcement 
capabilities and resources can target piracy networks). 
108. See Helmut Tuerk, The Resurgence of Piracy: A Phenomenon of 
Modern Times, 17 U. MIAMI INT’L COMP. L. 1, 38–39 (2009). 
109. See J. Ashley Roach, Agora: Piracy Prosecutions, Countering Piracy off 
Somalia: International Law and International Institutions, 104 AM. J. 
INT’L. L. 397, 414 (2010). 
110. See, e.g., Eileen Hsieh, Five Pirates Stand Trial in the Netherlands, 
CNN (May 26, 2010, 3:09 A.M.), http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/ 
europe/05/25/netherlands.pirates.trial/.  
111. Cf. Ginkel & Landman, supra note 50, at 742 (noting situations where 
the flag state would have universal jurisdiction to arrest and prosecute 
pirates, but either have not incorporated international law norms into 
their domestic laws, or are not willing to exercise this jurisdiction). 
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non-U.S. flagged ships on Kenya or the Seychelles.112 It is becoming 
apparent, moreover, that East African states have foreseen a 
jurisdictional race to the bottom that uses their criminal justice 
systems as dumping grounds for pirates and have accordingly ceased 
extending jurisdiction to any and all pirates caught somewhat 
nearby.113 Kenya, for instance, cancelled the Memoranda of 
Understanding it signed with the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and the European Union, citing fears of becoming a “second 
Guantanamo” for the pirates whose actions disproportionately affect 
wealthy nations.114  
It is important to note that, unlike piracy, money laundering or 
the financing of piracy are not crimes of universal jurisdiction and 
thus present serious jurisdictional difficulties for any would-be 
prosecutorial state not directly involved with the transaction or pirate 
event. Though it is relatively uncontroversial for a Somali pirate who 
hijacked a Korean vessel in international waters to be tried in Kenya 
or the Netherlands, the Yemini financier of that crime would not 
likely be tried in the same courtroom.115 Thus, while domestic courts 
somewhat local to a pirate event might be suitable for trying foot 
soldiers, they are particularly ineffective at punishing and deterring 
pirate financiers.  
It is not even clear that littoral states would want to convict high 
value targets and pirate financiers, since pirate incomes account for 
major inflows of foreign hard currency and purchase a great deal of 
political capital, nor is it evident that regional courts would always 
 
112. See Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, Pirate Trials, the International Criminal 
Court and Mob Justice: Reflections on Postcolonial Sovereignty in 
Kenya, 2 HUMAN. 51, 58 (2011) (finding that when the U.S. could have 
exercised universal jurisdiction to prosecute, it declined to do so and 
sent the captured pirates to Kenya); Warren Richey, Somali Pirate Gets 
25-Year Sentence: Will It Be a Deterrent?, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/ 
2011/0407/Somali-pirate-gets-25-year-sentence-Will-it-be-a-
deterrent?nav=topic-tag_topic_page-storyList.  
113. See Kelley, supra note 105; see also S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 37, pmbl. 
(“Noting with concern that the lack of capacity, domestic legislation, 
and clarity about how to dispose of pirates after their capture, has 
hindered more robust international action against the pirates off the 
coast of Somalia and in some cases led to pirates being released without 
facing justice . . . .”).  
114. Kelley, supra note 105. 
115. The law has begun to adapt to this problem, with some states exercising 
universal jurisdiction over the crimes of aiding and abetting piracy. See, 
e.g., United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 2013). Reliance 
on the evolution of the domestic law of aiding and abetting piracy 
worldwide, however, will present another patchwork solution to the 
problem and will fall short for the reasons already enumerated.  
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provide fair hearings and satisfactory prison facilities if they were to 
undertake pirate prosecutions.116  Kenya, for instance, has set up an 
anti-money laundering agency, purportedly to combat pirate 
financing, but the agency’s commitment to actually prosecuting 
offenders has been seriously called into question by domestic and 
international observers.117 Indeed, Kenya’s anti-money laundering 
agency has been placed on the Financial Action Taskforce’s “Black 
List,” meaning that the Taskforce, the world’s intergovernmental 
anti-money-trafficking agency, considers the Kenyan agency to be 
high-risk and non-cooperative in the fight against money laundering 
and terror funding.118 Nigeria’s government—to take another 
representative example—is likewise perceived to be notoriously 
corrupt and is reported to profit from the black market sale of pirated 
oil.119 Corrupt and vulnerable law enforcement and judicial systems in 
these states are not exceptional; rather they are emblematic of the 
serious problem that corruption poses for a piracy solution that relies 
on regional trials of pirate finance.  
The fact is that the problem of transnational pirate funding and 
money laundering is particularly unsuitable for prosecution in 
domestic courts. Even if this were not the case, however, a solution of 
domestic prosecution of pirate finance would fail as a global solution, 
since success demands domestic enforcement in problem jurisdictions 
across the globe. In the context of patchwork regional solutions, it is 
not hard to imagine a jurisdictional race to the bottom in which the 
states that turned a blind eye or refused to prosecute pirate financiers 
were rewarded for their inattention with a substantial influx of foreign 
hard currency in the form of ransom payments and/or black market 
profits. If the international community truly wants to arrive at a 
solution for global piracy, not just to push it from one shipping lane 
to another, and its finance from one unregulated jurisdiction to 
 
116. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, supra note 5 at 7–8 (noting that as much 
as 86 percent of pirate proceeds go to purchasing political capital); 
Mark Doyle, Nigeria’s Piracy—Another Form of Oil Theft, BBC 
(June 18, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-22956865 (reporting 
that roughly 20 percent of black market pirated oil goes to government 
enforcement agencies in the form of bribes).  
117. Kenya FRC to Fight Money Laundering, THE EAST AFRICAN (Apr. 12, 
2012), http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Kenya-FRC-to-fight-
money-laundering-/-/2560/1390946/-/view/printVersion/-/5u9jl6/-
/index.html.  
118. Id.; Public Statement, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE (June 21, 2013), 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions 
/documents/public-statement-june-2013.html.  
119. Doyle, supra note 116; see also UNODC, supra note 21, at 50 
(describing the high number of piracy attacks occurring in Nigeria). 
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another, then the transnational problem of pirate finance must be met 
with an international solution. 
G.  The Existing International Courts Illusion 
Since the ultimately ineffective domestic prosecutions of foot 
soldiers are increasingly undesired by the world community, and 
because prosecutions of pirate financiers are necessary but particularly 
unsuited for domestic courts, it follows that an international court 
would be called for in the fight against global maritime piracy. Three 
existing international courts—the ICJ, the LOS Tribunal, and the 
International Criminal Court (ICC)—have been suggested as suitable 
for pirate trials,120 but unfortunately none of these courts are willing, 
able, or suitable to accept jurisdiction over pirate financiers and 
organizers. 
Neither the ICJ nor the LOS Tribunal has the personal criminal 
jurisdiction required to prosecute high value pirates. Rather, both 
courts have only the authority to settle disputes between party 
states.121 Essentially, what a piracy prosecution would look like in 
either the ICJ or the LOS Tribunal is that one state—say, France—
would sue another state—say, Somalia—for its failure to uphold its 
vague and arguably permissive duty under UNCLOS (and/or the 
SUA Convention in the ICJ) to “co-operate to the fullest possible 
extent in the repression of piracy.”122 It is hard to imagine such a 
scenario coming to pass and even harder to claim that it would in any 
way be a prosecution of, or an effective tool in the fight against, 
piracy.  There are some arguments for augmenting the jurisdictions of 
the LOS Tribunal and the ICJ to include personal criminal 
 
120. See, e.g., Thedwall, supra note 37, at 501 (proposing that the LOS 
Tribunal, which is modeled after the ICJ, be expanded to include 
criminal jurisdiction over piracy); ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 14 
(discussing the expansion of ICC jurisdiction to cover piracy); 
Yvonne M. Dutton, Bringing Pirates to Justice: A Case for Including 
Piracy Within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 11 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 201 (2010) (positing that the ICC is the best forum 
for piracy offenses). 
121. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]; UNCLOS, supra 
note 25, art. 105, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 437. The LOS Tribunal settles 
disputes only under UNCLOS, whereas the ICJ can settle disputes 
arising under any international treaty or agreement. See The Tribunal, 
INT’L TRIB. FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, https://www.itlos.org/ 
index.php?id=15&L=0 (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
122. UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 100, 1833 U.N.T.S at 436. Though the 
1988 SUA Convention doesn’t explicitly criminalize piracy, it does call 
on party states to detain individuals who commit robbery and assault 
on the high seas and to prevent such actions going forward. 1988 SUA 
Convention, supra note 86, arts. 3(1), 7(1), 13(1)–(2), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 
224, 227, 230–31. 
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jurisdiction for pirates, but it seems unlikely to happen.123 Ultimately, 
the LOS Tribunal and the ICJ are not well-suited to hear individual 
criminal cases, as every element of these tribunals—from the 
organizational structure to the personnel (e.g., the lack of a 
prosecutor’s office) to the physical facilities—is designed for 
non-criminal cases between state parties. 
Similarly, the ICC is not a good fit for piracy cases. Not only do 
the crimes of piracy and piracy finance—relatively ordinary offenses 
compared to the ICC’s purview of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, and aggression—not fit within the court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction, but also the drafters of the Rome Statute considered 
adding piracy to the Court’s jurisdiction and intentionally left it 
out.124 Moreover, trying piracy cases in the ICC could do a great deal 
to weaken the Court’s normative power throughout the world. To try 
what would amount to armed robbers—be they Somalis who captured 
a tanker for ransom or Nigerians stealing cellphones from ferries—or 
even the high value criminals of pirate finance, alongside genocidaires 
and war criminals, would be a waste of the Court’s political capital 
and a diminution of the Court’s normative power as the voice for the 
victims of “unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience 
of humanity.”125 
Thus, it seems that a new international tribunal would be 
necessary to effectively try the transnational financiers and organizers 
of global maritime piracy. Along with the usage of onboard security, 
an international piracy tribunal is the second prong of the sustainable, 
global solution to maritime piracy. Such a court could be established 
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and will be discussed in more 
detail in Section III below.  
H. The Private Sector Illusion 
A common refrain among the shipping industry and international 
observers is that states should bear the responsibility for the fight 
against piracy.126 One can imagine why industry might want to hold 
this line: shippers think that they benefit enormously from the 
more-or-less free (i.e., broadly externalized) protection of state navies, 
limited though it may be.127 It is less clear, however, why academics 
 
123. See Totten & Bernal, supra note 39, at 379–80.  
124. Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, [1994] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 26, 68, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.l (Part 2) (citing 
to Comment 1(d)). 
125. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
126. See Dutton, supra note 50, at 149. 
127. It is not at all clear that a state naval strategy actually saves merchants 
money; see supra note 72 and accompanying text; infra Section III.C. 
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and policymakers have been so reluctant to call for room for the 
market to innovate and experiment with various private solutions, 
especially since the bulk of anti-piracy gains have come from the 
private sector. Ultimately, it seems this reticence in the literature 
stems from concerns about state monopolization of violence and 
unsupported assumptions about rogue contractors shooting first and 
asking questions later. 
The question of who should be responsible for the fight against 
piracy has both normative and empirical dimensions. As a normative 
matter, it is unclear that there is any good reason to restrict the 
defensive use of weapons on the high seas to state navies. A common 
worry in the literature is that “permitting private citizens to engage 
in activities that have thus far been reserved for state military 
personnel poses risks.”128 Aside from the fact that a loaded gun 
anywhere on the high seas poses risks, this argument is a strawman: 
the function of private contractors on ships is exclusively one of 
self-defense, a privilege never exclusively enjoyed by military 
personnel. The use of offensive force by private contractors would be 
another matter altogether—and a potential cause for concern—but 
the restriction of a few guards with rifles onboard a merchant ship 
almost necessarily limits their activities to defensive measures. 
Offensive use of force should be—and is—considered beyond the pale 
for ride-along guards.129 
Amid the rhetoric of the “war” and the “fight against piracy,” it 
is easy to forget that the most effective counter-piracy measure to 
date, the use of on-ship security personnel, is essentially self-defensive. 
The use of force in response to imminent deadly force is no more 
normatively suited to soldiers than it is to civilians. Likewise, few 
would argue that the justified use of deadly force in self-defense by 
private citizens on the high seas is any less justifiable than it would 
be on land, especially given the fact that pirates almost always fire 
their weapons and absolutely mean to do harm.130 Indeed, the right of 
personal self-defense qualifies as customary international law, is one of 
the “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,”131 and 
has even been expressly codified in international law.132 Very few 
 
128. See, e.g., Dutton, supra note 50, at 109. 
129. The potential of PMSCs operating armed vessels is somewhat more 
worrisome, since those are more capable of being used offensively. See 
infra Section III.A. 
130. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 89 (noting that Somali Pirates, for 
instance, opened fire in 92 percent of attacks in 2009 and 2010). 
131. ICJ Statute, supra note 121, art. 38(1)(c) (stating that the general 
principles are a source of international law covered by the ICJ). 
132. Rome Statute, supra note 125, art. 31(1)(c), 2187 U.N.T.S. at 107; see 
also WAR BY CONTRACT: HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND 
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would argue that states ought to have monopolies on the use of force, 
even deadly force, in self-defense.   
Private citizens are also restricted in the use of force in ways that 
state military forces are not. Generally, private citizens are more 
restricted than militaries in their use of aggressive force and face a 
higher burden in proving a use of defensive force is justified.  
Likewise, military forces are governed by flag state rules of 
engagement, which can vary from state to state, are often classified, 
and do not always have the force of law.133 Private citizens, on the 
other hand, are governed at least by the criminal and civil law of a 
flag state, which rarely if ever permits the use of deadly force except 
in situations justified by self-defense and subjects violators to the 
jurisdiction of a domestic court.134 Thus, the rules governing the use of 
force are generally neither better nor more uniform for military 
personnel than for private citizens, and experience indicates that 
military personnel are at least as likely to do harm to innocents as are 
private contractors.135   
It would also seem preferable that those who take on the risk of 
pirate attack—the merchant shippers—should bear the cost of 
mitigating the risks attendant on the benefits they derive from use of 
international shipping lanes. Shippers generally do not have to transit 
pirate-infested waters. For instance, it is marginally more expensive to 
go around the much safer Cape of Good Hope instead of through the 
Gulf of Aden—five trips on the former route equal six via the latter—
and it does not seem fair to externalize the costs of industry’s risk-
taking on the taxpayers of naval-patrolling nations. Shipments of 
humanitarian aid to states adjacent to pirated waters do not have this 
option, of course, and the argument for affording them military 
escorts is probably stronger. 
The incentives for security companies to stay within the bounds 
of the law are also stronger than those bearing on state navies. The 
political risk for state mistreatment of suspected pirates on the high 
seas is very low. No country is likely to go to war over the shooting or 
erroneous apprehension of fishermen suspected of piracy; rather the 
 
PRIVATE CONTRACTORS 179 (Francesco Francioni & Natalino Ronzitti 
eds., 2011) (stating that the right to self-defense is codified as part of 
most national legislations as well as international law).  
133. See Banerji & Jose, supra note 76. 
134. They are also probably covered by the laws of their state of citizenship, 
the state of any potential victim, and the state of the territorial waters 
they may transit through.  
135. Moreover, the problem of a failure to prosecute applies equally to 
military and private security personnel.  
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realistic worst-case scenario involves diplomatic amends-making.136 A 
private security company that makes similar mistakes, however, risks 
criminal and civil censure, not to mention going out of business. 
These companies are profit-motivated and reliant upon the quality of 
their reputation, and they are not likely to succeed in the marketplace 
or qualify a ship owner for a decreased insurance rate, insofar as they 
are known to be international lawbreakers and/or ineffective 
counter-piracy forces. 
As an empirical matter, recent experience demonstrates that 
where small-scale private security anti-piracy measures have met with 
great success, massive public international efforts have proven 
ineffective. A timeline comparing the development of state 
counter-piracy measures in response to the Somali crisis and the data 
on the events themselves is telling in its complete absence of a 
correlation between state action and pirate deterrence. In late 2008 
and early 2009, the U.N. Security Council adopted numerous 
resolutions on piracy in the Gulf of Aden,137 the Djibouti Code of 
Conduct was signed to coordinate anti-piracy efforts among regional 
states, wealthy trading nations signed Memoranda of Understanding 
with Kenya to try pirates, and the Contact Group on Piracy off the 
Coast of Somalia began meeting in January 2009.138 Amid this burst 
of public international effort, there was a general expectation that 
piracy would decline.139 Instead, attacks spiked.140 It was not until the 
large-scale adoption of private or public guards on individual ships 
that the attacks in Somalia began to decline.141 Tellingly, this decline 
was accompanied by an increase in piracy incidents in regions of the 
world where the use of security personnel was comparatively rare.142  
 
136. The case of the Italian Marines facing trial in India is so unexpected and 
unusual that, until similar prosecutions arise, it may be treated as an 
outlier.  
137. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008); S.C. 
Res. 1838, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 37; S.C. 
Res. 1897, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1897 (Nov. 30, 2009). 
138. KRASKA, supra note 26, at 145. 
139. Id.  
140. ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS: 
REPORT FOR THE PERIOD OF 1 JANUARY – 30 JUNE 2011, at 5–6 (2011) 
(showing that the total number of attacks in 2009 and 2010 were the 
highest since the initial resurgence of piracy in 2008). 
141. See West, supra note 54. 
142. See Cowell, supra note 11. 
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In recent years, the European Union and the United States have 
slashed tens of billions of defense spending.143 In light of these cuts 
and the shifting geopolitical priorities they represent, it seems unlikely 
that states are going to commit to fighting piracy at sea in the 
long-term. Nor is it apparent that, even if a state naval solution were 
effective and affordable, states should have a monopoly on anti-piracy 
efforts, since the shipping companies themselves are in the best 
position to assess the risk of piracy, avoid the risk, and combat it at 
the point of attack. It is also fairer and more economical for the cost 
of protecting merchandise to be born at least in large part by those 
who receive the greatest benefit from its sale. To the extent that risks 
inherent in international shipping are not internalized by industry, 
the maritime shipping industry will be incentivized (and subsidized) 
to take risks that otherwise might not make economic sense.  
Reliance on private industry accompanied by a strong regime of 
accountability (i.e., political, legal, and economic cost internalization) 
is the third prong of a sustainable global solution. 
III.  A Sustainable, Global Solution 
For the foreseeable future, underdeveloped coastline near shipping 
routes from which pirates can operate will be abundant, as will the 
supply of low-level pirate labor and equipment. The emergence of 
transnational pirate finance and organization has combined with an 
oversupply of pirate labor to make for a new transitional piracy 
paradigm. In light of this relatively new state of affairs, it is apparent 
that the old methods of fighting piracy will fail to suppress what is 
now essentially a global problem. At best, effective localized solutions 
will drive the funders to seek new markets in which to finance piracy. 
Nor will solutions that target only low-level pirate foot soldiers 
succeed, given the superabundance of ready, willing, and able pirate 
labor. Similarly, solutions that focus exclusively on the financiers of 
piracy will fail because of the low start-up cost of a small-scale pirate 
enterprise.   
Unlike terrorists or other ideologically motivated actors, pirates 
and pirate financiers are profit-motivated, utility-maximizing 
opportunists, whose behavior can be altered by decreasing the 
profitability of the enterprise. However, pirate foot soldiers and pirate 
financiers are not responsive to the same types of incentives; 
 
143. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, Shrinking Europe Military Spending Stirs 
Concern, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
04/23/world/europe/europes-shrinking-military-spending-under-
scrutiny.html?pagewanted=all; Defence Spending: Squeezing the 
Pentagon, THE ECONOMIST (July 6, 2013), http://www.economist.com/ 
news/united-states/21580460-wrong-way-cut-americas-military-budget-
squeezing-pentagon. 
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therefore, an effective and sustainable global solution must work both 
from the bottom up and from the top down. The sustainable, global 
solution proposed here will: (1) raise the cost of starting a successful 
pirate expedition to a level beyond the reach of the littoral world’s 
fishermen and small-time gangsters; (2) cut off the sources of funding 
that are required to mount a successful pirate expedition given the 
raised start-up costs; and (3) allow private industry the space to 
innovate and experiment with effective deterrence techniques while 
holding industry responsible for its share of the political, legal, and 
economic costs of those efforts.144  
A.  Defensive Personnel on Ships 
Ships transiting high-risk areas should be encouraged to carry 
private security or military personnel onboard and to abide by other 
best anti-piracy practices, such as maintaining higher speeds through 
dangerous waterways, increasing vigilance, and outfitting ships with 
razor wire.145 Not only are onboard security personnel more effective 
than navies, as they are guaranteed to be present at the point and 
time of attack, but their usage is economically sustainable in a way 
that naval patrols are not. Widespread use of private security 
personnel also likely reduces the drag of maritime piracy on the global 
economy better than state naval protection, since the relatively low 
costs of the security detail may furthermore be set off by a decrease in 
insurance rates. Indeed, the Chairman of the Lloyds of London 
Marine Committee confirmed that a discount is offered to those who 
carry security personnel, a break reported to be as high as 50 
percent.146    
Armed security personnel onboard merchant ships transiting 
dangerous waters will be effective as part of a larger, collective 
counter-piracy strategy only if there is a high rate of participation, 
 
144. This solution pertains principally, though not exclusively, to merchant 
ships. Private yachts and other non-merchant vessels should generally 
be discouraged from transiting waters where there is known pirate 
danger. However, the carriage of weapons or guards by non-merchant 
individuals would have a similar preventative effect and their self-
defensive use is no less normatively suited to civilians on a pleasure 
cruise than it is to oil tankers. See Southeast Asia Still Worst for 
Pirates Despite High-Profile Somali Attacks, NEWS.COM.AU (Oct. 28, 
2013, 12:44 PM), http://www.news.com.au/world/southeast-asia-still-
worst-for-pirates-despite-highprofile-somali-attacks/story-fndir2ev-
1226746660014 (“Among the safest ships are those that employ armed 
guards—cruise companies as well as cargo ships have looked at this 
option.”). 
145. BMP4, supra note 69, at vi, 28. 
146. Jonathan Sibun, Typhon Fights Back Against Pirates, THE TELEGRAPH 
(Jan. 15, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/ 
9016188/Typhon-fights-back-against-pirates.html. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2013 
Maritime Piracy: A Sustainable Global Solution 
209 
since otherwise pirates will simply attack the unarmed ships.147 
Fortunately, this is the direction that industry and best practices are 
trending. As noted though, the prospect of thousands of ships with 
firearms onboard and in boats alongside them frightens some 
commentators.148  It would probably be beneficial to discourage the 
use of private armored patrol boats, as their use increases the 
likelihood of private security contractors being used in an offensive 
manner. Efforts at uniform regulation of the industry are already 
underway.149 Moreover, an authoritative maritime security company 
vetting and certification process, run by the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) or a similar organization, could also have a 
beneficial regulatory effect. Participation in such a program could be 
incentivized if it were recognized by insurers as an exclusive badge of 
reliability and were accompanied by the authority of an insurance 
rate discount.  
Still, it is not clear at present that more regulation is in fact 
necessary, since military and private security personnel are already 
subject to various rules regarding the use of force, and courts seem to 
be up to the challenge of prosecuting wrongdoers.150 Evidentiary 
challenges notwithstanding, it is essential that flag states investigate 
and prosecute misuses of force at sea.  It remains to be seen how the 
case of the two Italian marines of the Enrica Lexie will turn out, 
though the precedent set by their trial (and possible conviction) may 
prove to have a significant deterrent effect insofar as it opens 
malefactors to prosecution by both the flag state and the victim state. 
B. An International Piracy Court 
Although common carriage of security personnel is an effective 
deterrent to successful pirate attacks, it is not by itself a solution to 
the problem of global maritime piracy. The typical security detail of 
three to six armed guards can effectively deter a small to 
medium-scale pirate attack of the kind affordable by pirate 
entrepreneurs, but as pirates adapt to the presence of onboard 
security personnel, it is not hard to imagine larger-scale and more 
coordinated attacks that could overwhelm a single detail.151 Such 
 
147. If participation gets to the point when ships are assumed to have 
security aboard, then free-riders will cease to become a security problem 
and become an economic one for shippers. 
148. See BROWN, supra note 56, at 9 (“If unchecked, these fleets [of private 
armed patrol boats] could be more akin to seaborne vigilantes . . . .”). 
149. See, e.g., 100 Series Rules, supra note 87. 
150. See, e.g., Banerji & Jose, supra note 76 (reporting that Italian marines 
are awaiting trial in India for fatally shooting Indian fishermen). 
151. See BROWN, supra note 56, at 3, 7 (“[P]rivate counter-piracy forces are 
already changing the way pirates operate.”). 
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attacks would require a degree of organization and start-up capital 
that can generally only be provided by the high value targets of 
transnational pirate financiers.   
The United States, inter alia, has recognized the necessity of 
going after transnational pirate finance and organization, promising to 
adopt an “Al Capone” approach to arrest and hamstring the top 
twelve pirate financiers and organizers.152 Though it has yet to be seen 
how effective the United States’ proposed approach will prove—
especially since it intends to steer clear of pirate activity per se—it 
seems that more will be required to effectively cut off global pirate 
finance. As the problem of pirate finance is transnational but not 
subject to universal jurisdiction, and since a piecemeal approach 
reliant wholly on domestic law enforcement and courts cannot be 
trusted to investigate, apprehend, and successfully prosecute pirate 
financiers, a coordinated international approach is in order. 
The effective prosecution of the high pirate crimes of finance, 
organization, and money laundering calls for a new international 
piracy tribunal. The easiest, and most legitimate, way to constitute 
such a court would be under the auspices of the U.N., pursuant to a 
Security Council resolution based on the powers granted to it under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.153 The Security Council has already 
passed a host of resolutions on Somali piracy under Chapter VII, 
authorizing states to use “all necessary means” in the fight against 
piracy,154 and has also used Chapter VII to institute successful 
international tribunals in the past.155 Indeed, the Security Council has 
passed a series of resolutions declaring its intention to consider 
establishing an international piracy court under Chapter VII of the 
Charter.156   
 
152. McElroy, supra note 107. 
153. U.N. Charter art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures 
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.”). 
154. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 137, ¶ 7; see also S.C. Res. 1838, 
supra note 137, ¶ 3; S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 137, ¶ 10; S.C. Res. 
1851, supra note 37, ¶ 6; S.C. Res. 1918, para. 2, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1918 (Apr. 27, 2010); S.C. Res. 1950, supra note 37, ¶ 2; S.C. 
Res. 2020, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2020 (Nov. 22, 2011). 
155. Chapter VII was the basis of both the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda. S.C. Res. 827, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); 
S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
156. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1976, para. 26, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1976 (Apr. 11, 
2011); S.C. Res. 2015, supra note 28, ¶¶ 16–17; S.C. Res. 2077, para. 19, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/2077 (Nov. 21, 2012) (calling for courts with 
“substantial international participation” to try “not only suspects 
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Though the organization of such a court would obviously be a 
matter for debate, there are a few important structural elements that 
should be present. The tribunal should limit its jurisdiction to high 
crimes of piracy, however those are to be defined, or high value 
targets, and its founding documents should include a mandate to 
pursue the financiers and coordinators of pirate organizations. 
Interestingly, given the current international law of piracy, such a 
mandate would extend to the financiers and directors of private 
security companies who use deadly force in non-self-defensive 
counter-piracy operations.157 Thus, the court would serve as an 
effective deterrent for both pirate financiers and the private security 
corporations who might be tempted to misuse force at sea. 
An office of the prosecutor capable of coordinating with 
international and domestic law enforcement would be another 
important structural element of a piracy tribunal. Various 
international and domestic law enforcement organizations have 
already begun investigations into pirate funding networks, though due 
to the transnational nature of those networks, each organization has 
only a piece of the overall picture.158 For instance, INTERPOL formed 
the Maritime Piracy Taskforce in January 2010 to detail the 
organizational and financial structure of pirate networks and to assist 
 
captured at sea, but also anyone who incites or intentionally facilitates 
piracy operations, including key figures of criminal networks involved in 
piracy who illicitly plan, organize, facilitate, or finance and profit from” 
piracy). 
157. According to UNCLOS Article 101:  
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or 
the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, 
and directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, 
or against persons or property on board such ship 
or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a 
place outside the jurisdiction of any State . . . . 
 UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 101, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 436. 
158. See Pierre St. Hilaire, Somali Piracy: Following the Paper Trail 2–3 
(June 2012) (on file with the United Arab Emirates Counter Piracy 
Conference), available at http://www.counterpiracy.ae/2012-briefing-
papers (recognizing that one of the biggest challenges to defeating piracy 
networks is the lack of information sharing between key agencies 
combating piracy). 
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in prosecuting “high value” targets159 and is currently working 
alongside Europol’s Project Maritime Piracy,160 but these 
organizations confront the limits of their institutional competence 
when infiltrating formal and informal finance and organizational 
networks in East Africa, for example. These international police 
organizations, in concert with the Financial Action Task Force, the 
U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, and any number of domestic efforts 
like the U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service and other national 
intelligence services, could provide the office of the prosecutor with 
evidence sufficient for effective prosecutions. Likewise, the office of the 
prosecutor would serve as the coordination center that these varied 
global and regional counter-piracy efforts so sorely need.  
Although some fear that an international piracy court would be 
prohibitively expensive, evidence suggests that it would probably be 
no more expensive than domestic trials in a comparably efficient legal 
system. The per day costs of the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, for instance, do not differ dramatically from those 
of U.S. domestic courts.161 It stands to reason that prosecutions in an 
international piracy court would cost no more than the highly 
complex war-crime trials. Moreover, the establishment of an 
international piracy tribunal would likely produce various economies 
of scale and integration. The accumulation of institutional knowledge 
and expertise and trying numerous high-level targets in the same 
place would likely result in efficiencies that would, if anything, 
decrease the global cost of piracy prosecutions.162 The financing 
mechanism of the IMO—whose contributions are based on a formula 
dependent primarily upon the tonnage of a state’s merchant fleet163—
 
159. Maritime Piracy, INTERPOL, http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/ 
Maritime-piracy/Maritime-piracy (last visited Mar. 14, 2014) (naming 
piracy leaders and financiers as such high-value individuals).  
160. Joint Efforts Against Maritime Piracy, EUROPOL (Dec. 16, 2010), 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/press/joint-efforts-against-
maritime-piracy-643. 
161. David Wippan, The Costs of International Justice, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 
861, 863 (2006). 
162. It would probably be least costly to follow the lead of global 
manufacturing and outsource all the prosecutions to a developing state 
where all costs are cheaper, but this is a bad idea for many reasons. See 
supra Section II.F. It would also be politically unsustainable. See infra 
Section III.C. Finally, for important neocolonialism objections to the 
“dumping” of piracy prosecutions on the developing world, see Taussig-
Rubbo, supra note 112, at 60–61 (“[P]irate transfers and trials have been 
subject in Kenya to a variety of readings . . . [such as] it is being 
exploited as a dumping ground by wealthy states . . . .”). 
163. Structure of IMO, INT’L MAR. ORG. (last visited Mar. 14, 2014), 
http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Structure.aspx. 
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presents a particularly fair, established, and sustainable means of 
funding such a court, since it would push costs down to states who 
would then most likely force private industry to internalize them via 
maritime taxes and fees.  
C.  Market Solutions 
For the twofold global solution of protection on ships and an 
international piracy court for high value targets to be sustainable, the 
political and economic costs of protecting merchant vessels should be 
internalized by the maritime industry to the greatest extent possible. 
At present, international naval forces spend over a billion dollars per 
year on largely ineffective naval patrols.164 In an era of near universal 
cutbacks in military spending, it seems inevitable that the current 
naval patrols will prove to be economically unsustainable.   
Public expenditures on naval patrols are also politically 
unsustainable. Unlike private security companies, civilian-controlled 
militaries are limited by political will, which tends to turn against 
expensive, long-term military engagements, especially when the 
citizenry faces little danger itself and there is belt-tightening at home. 
Since navies cannot be relied upon to continue to police the seas into 
the long-term, any solution that does not force merchants to bear the 
cost of a long-term counter-piracy approach risks collapsing under the 
weight of political disfavor.  Similarly, an international piracy court 
under the auspices of the U.N. would be largely immune from the 
reluctance of individual states to prosecute pirate finance, be it for 
reasons of political fatigue, or profit from the pirate economy. 
Not only is internalizing costs in the maritime industry more fair 
than spreading them among the taxpayers of the naval force 
nations—since it is the shipping industry that runs the risk and most 
directly benefits from it—but it also makes economic sense. An 
anti-piracy model that relies on on-ship private security personnel will 
virtually eliminate the need to fund forces like Operation Atalanta 
and will eliminate or greatly reduce the number of ships hijacked and 
held for ransom, thus substantially reducing maritime piracy’s drag 
on the world economy.165 Moreover, the cost of hiring onboard 
 
164. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 158 (citing Anna Bowden & Shikha 
Basnet, The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011, at 2 (working paper) 
(on file with Oceans Beyond Piracy & One Earth Future Found.), 
available at 
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/economic_cost_ 
of_piracy_2011.pdf).  
165. The wealth transfer model of piracy for ransom is incredibly inefficient, 
since, on average, $120 million in ransoms cost the global economy 
between $900 million and $3.3 billion each year from 2008 to 2013. 
Brad Plumer, The Economics of Somali Piracy, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 
2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/ 
2013/03/03/the-economics-of-somali-piracy/. The discounted prices of 
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security is offset by a concomitant decrease in insurance rates. 
Similarly, if economies of scale and integration emerge from an 
international piracy tribunal, it stands to reason that it could present 
a net savings for the world economy.  Thus, if anything, the 
large-scale adoption of private security on ships, combined with an 
international piracy court, should ultimately reduce the cost of 
shipping long-term (independent of all other factors unrelated to 
maritime piracy).  
The market is also adaptive and reactive in ways that the public 
sector is not.  Private industry can innovate as the pirates adapt to 
counter-pirate measures, and it can experiment and fail in ways that 
democratic states cannot or will not. Pirates quickly adapt to 
anti-piracy tactics.166 Whereas state militaries are generally huge 
bureaucratic organizations unsuited to fast adaptation and 
innovation, individual private firms can switch tactics and try and 
discard new approaches at a pace that can rival pirate adaptation, if 
not surpass it.  
IV.  Conclusion 
The catalogue of pirate myth is gigantic.  The literary conceits of 
plank-walking and buried treasure propagated by Captain Charles 
Johnson,167 and the piracy solutions of today’s academics and 
policymakers, illustrate a hazard that attends discussions of maritime 
piracy. The temptation to understand the phenomenon in light of 
one’s preconceptions or area of expertise—be it romantic literature or 
economic development—is great, and this temptation has resulted in 
both historical and policy-oriented literatures that are plagued by 
illusions and misconceptions. By critically examining some of the 
accepted wisdom and proposed solutions, this article has attempted to 
discern the pertinent facts from the persuasive illusions and to draw a 
pragmatic conclusion from them. 
Today’s transnational piracy paradigm calls for a solution that is 
both global and addresses modern piracy. In light of the recent 
decades of developments in maritime piracy, it has become clear that 
a multifaceted approach is called for. Our workable approach uses 
onboard security to deter pirates at the point of attack; an 
 
the black market imply that piracy for theft and resale is also hugely 
inefficient. 
166. See, e.g., Valdmanis & Saul, supra note 23 (“Nigerians . . . keep an eye 
on what the Somalis and other pirates are doing and incorporate 
inspired changes.”). 
167. Charles Johnson, generally suspected to be a pseudonym for the novelist 
Daniel Defoe or Nathaniel Mist, penned the text that effectively set 
pirate tropes for three centuries. See generally CHARLES JOHNSON, A 
GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PYRATES (2d ed. 1724). 
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international court to coordinate and secure prosecutions against 
pirate financiers and to destroy their transnational criminal networks; 
and a set of policies that at once allows private industry to innovate 
while requiring it to internalize the maximum amount possible of the 
political, legal, and economic costs of the shipping industry.  This 
approach will save blood and treasure in a way that spreads these 
savings across the littoral world. 
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